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Abstract 
The safety of patients is an important responsibility of health care providers, and
significant compensation costs may arise if providers are negligent. A widely debated
option involves liability for such compensation being placed with the hospital rather than
the individual clinician, a system known as “enterprise liability”. In the US, partial
adoption of enterprise liability, and proposals for its universal introduction, have
accompanied high profile “malpractice insurance crises” in the last two decades.
Hospitals in England and Wales have been subject to this system since 1990, and risk
pooling arrangements have emerged subsequently allowing hospitals to transfer their
liability risk to an agency known as the NHS Litigation Authority. We explore some of
the mechanisms used by this agency to provide hospital management with financial
incentives to take care. We estimate the influence of these arrangements on the use of
diagnostic imaging tests within hospitals, using a panel data set covering the period 2000-
2004, during which period a policy shift took place leading to a form of “natural
experiment”. Our results suggest that the use of diagnostic tests did not respond to the
incentives created during this period. We speculate that certain types of patient care
activity, including the use of diagnostic tests, may be less responsive to incentives placed
at the level of the hospital by comparison with incentives placed at the level of the
clinician. Our findings may have implications for jurisdictions contemplating a move to
enterprise liability, as well as wider implications for public sector organizations faced with
financial incentives to improve service quality.
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1. Introduction 
Health care providers owe a duty of care to those they serve, and a breach of that duty
can be used as a basis for compensation claims. In many countries, including England
and Wales, tort liability is the way the lawarranges for those who believe they have been
harmed by someone to recover a sum of money in compensation for the harm caused
(see Fenn et al, 2004). Both the merits of the claim, and the amount of compensation, are
determined through a legal process which is underpinned by the ultimate option of trial
in a court before a judge. These procedures are well-established for many types of harm
including medical negligence. Patients whose claims are successful (in pre-trial settlement
or at trial) receive compensation for economic loss, future health care costs, and for pain
and suffering.2
Although this broad approach underlies all tort law, a number of significant variations
exist in the approaches that health care systems take towards implementing liability rules.
One important distinction relates to who is the subject of the claim: the clinician (who
made the error) or the hospital for whom s/he works?3 In England and Wales, for
example, since 1990, the hospital has accepted responsibility for the errors of its
clinicians, under a system known as “enterprise liability” – or “NHS indemnity” as it was
called in England and Wales. In the US, by way of contrast, it is typically clinicians who
are the object of medical negligence suits though, in a number of States, health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and managed care organizations (MCOs) have
decided not to contest judgements holding them vicariously liable for their staff’s errors,
therebycreating de facto enterprise liability– what Leone, Jr (2006) refers to as the “virtual
reality of enterprise liability”4. An ongoing policy debate in the US has sought to
encourage wider adoption of enterprise liabilitybut this has yet to be resolved.5
2 Other means of redress include making a complaint; complaints procedures normallycover a wider range
of circumstances than claims for patient compensation. See Wallis and Mulcahy(2001).
3 Another distinction is between strict liability (where the injurer is liable for damages whatever the care
supplied) and negligence liability (where the injurer is only liable if the level of care supplied is found to be
belowthat required bythe law). Our focus is on the latter liabilityrule: this characterises NHS liability and,
indeed, that in operation in manyother health care systems, including the US.
4 Indeed this was the process by which NHS indemnity emerged in the UK – the NHS autonomously
decided that it would not assert its right to recover damages from its employees after meeting its vicarious
liability for their errors. The management of NHS hospitals were subsequentlybound bythis agreement.
5 The earliest proposals for a system resembling enterprise liability in the US date back to Steves (1975). As
Bovbjerg and Berenson (2006) document, this and subsequent suggestions have typically reacted to crises
in the market for clinicians’ medical negligence insurance (though Baker (2005) contests the significance of
such crises). For examples of more proposals for the US, see Weiler (1991), Abraham and Weiler (1994)
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The theoretical properties of liability rules themselves are well understood. In principle,
making the ‘tortfeasor’ (i.e. the party responsible for the accident) liable for the damages
s/he has caused induces optimal levels of care, in the sense that the marginal benefit of
reduced accident probabilities is equated with the marginal cost of the care (see Shavell,
1987). Yet such optimal deterrence can quite readily be undermined (again, Shavell,
1987, provides a comprehensive treatment). For example, anticipated court error at the
trial stage can send inaccurate signals about expected damages which, in turn, affect
potential tortfeasors’ marginal calculations. Or situations where the potential tortfeasor
has insufficient resources to meet liabilities can also dilute incentives for care since, above
a certain level of damage, s/he cannot pay the expected damages (i.e. s/he is ‘judgement-
proof’). One solution, relevant to our paper as we explain below, sees the tortfeasor
purchase insurance against future liability: while reducing the prospect of judgement-
proofness, incentives for care can be undermined if the insurance is so complete as to
shield the tortfeasor from all consequences of anyharm s/he maycause.
For these reasons (and others), the actual effects of liability rules require empirical study,
but the literature has found it difficult to reach unambiguous conclusions about the role
of tort liability in encouraging care in healthcare settings.6 Kessler and McClellan (1996,
2002) and Dubay et al (1999, 2001) are relatively recent examples of papers that have
found strong effects using US data, while others such as Beider and Hagen (2004) have
failed to confirm such results. Overall, comprehensive surveys by Bovbjerg and Sloan
(1998) and Mello and Brennan (2002) conclude that an empirical link has not been
convincingly established. Of course, care may be oversupplied or undersupplied and it is
possible to interpret an oversupply as ‘defensive medicine’; several authors have tried to
identify this. Again, the results are mixed. Localio et al (1993) found statistically
significant links between several obstetric procedures and previous claims experience (in
New York State) but Baldwin et al (1995) could not confirm this result. Kessler and
McClellan (1996) find a negative relationship between tort reform (i.e. reductions in
liability) and costs of the compensation system: they interpret this as evidence of
and Peters, Jr (2008). Sloan and Chepke (2008) also provide an interesting discussion of these debates and
their prospects.
6 Related empirical work is available in other settings that use tort liabilityas well. For example, automobile
accidents are influenced by driver care and many jurisdictions operate tort-based compensation
arrangements: see McKewin (1989), Devlin (1992) and Cummins et al (2001).
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defensive medicine.7 Subsequent work by Sloan et al (1997) fails to find substantial
evidence of any link between clinicians’ previous claims history and (i) the choice
between Cesarian and vaginal birth; (ii) the use of antenatal testing, and (iii) mothers’
satisfaction with their treatment levels. In general, they find no significant differences as
claims history changes, suggesting that liability risk (as measured by previous history)
does not affect (and, in particular, raise) care levels.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which risk sharing arrangements in an enterprise
liability context affect the quality of care supplied by hospitals. We use data from the
National Health Service in England and Wales, but the issues of patient safety that we
address are clearly common to other health systems. In order to capture the variation in
liability risk across hospitals, we make use of explicit incentive mechanisms introduced as
part of their risk sharing arrangements.8 The explicit incentives we study come in two
forms: liability insurance deductibles that seek to share risk between each hospital and its
insurer (the NHS Litigation Authority) and, then, premium discounts for attaining
objectively set (and monitored) risk management standards – again offered by the
NHSLA. Both deductibles and attained risk management standards differ across
hospitals (and can change over time) according to decisions the hospitals themselves take
and we have data on every hospital’s arrangements in this respect over a five year period
(2000-2004). In addition, we have uniquely matched these to hospital level data on
hospital characteristics including measures of patient care. To be specific, we examine
the association between hospitals’ liability insurance deductible levels, the risk
management standards they achieve and the utilization of diagnostic imaging tests – one
type of diagnostic activity that we suggest can be helpful in reducing medical error and
improving qualityof care and patient safety.9
Fenn et al (2007) explored the relationship between the incidence of diagnostic tests and
deductibles in a given year, but here we extend that analysis using a panel dataset
7 It is possible, as Danzon (2000b) explains, to attribute this result to the presence of managed care in the
US. Thus, in a follow-up study, Kessler and McClellan (2000) control for managed care and find a reduced
but still significant ‘defensive effect’.
8 This distinguishes our paper from many other studies, where differential liability risk is proxied by
differences in tort rules across States or over time, or by past claims histories. In addition, our paper
examines the issue of liability risk and incentives for care in the context of a system-wide enterprise liability
system, whereas other studies have focused more specificallyon clinician-based insurance.
9 Such diagnostic tests have also been used by other authors as proxies for care: see, for example, Kessler
and McClellan (1996). We discuss the role of diagnostic tests in a little more detail in Section 5.
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covering the above five year period. At the beginning of this period deductibles varied
across hospitals, but from 2002 onwards they became zero for all hospitals, after a policy
decision to transfer all liability risk from hospitals to the NHSLA. By looking over a
number of years during which these risk sharing arrangements were changing, we are able
to observe variations of deductibles between hospitals prior to 2002, and a sudden shift
over time in the level of excesses for all hospitals, after which the NHSLA increased its
reliance on risk management standards as a means of influencing hospital behaviour. In
effect, we have a “natural experiment” resulting from this policy change, with the added
advantage that the experiment is embedded in a cross-sectional and time-series data set,
raising the possibility of moving beyond a straightforward before/after study design and
allowing us to explore the potential for using panel data methods.10
Our analysis focuses on the health care sector, where the role of tort and other
mechanisms for encouraging good standards of care have been extensively discussed in
recent years (eg Danzon 2000a,b; Department of Health 2003), but the methods and
results may have implications for other public services. For example, local authorities
(whether they be federal, state of county level) commonly face enterprise liability and
insure themselves against liability claims, giving rise to similar issues to those that we
study: can tort encourage care levels in the face of risk pooling arrangements? The public
corporation arrangements found in many countries (for example in the rail or energy
sectors) also raise similar institutional issues.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some institutional
background before the third explains our estimation methodology and a fourth presents
our data. The fifth section contains results and a discussion of these before conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
2. The institutional background 
In 1990 the NHS in England and Wales adopted responsibility for any mistakes of
directly employed staff, the resulting “enterprise liability” system focusing claims onto
hospital management rather than individual clinicians. Following this, in November 1995
the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA), a Special Health Authority, was established and
10 As is common in such cases, the qualityof available instruments is central to such analyses; a point we
address in Section 3.
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became the main mechanism allowing NHS bodies to pool the costs of liabilities to
patients. The NHSLA administers a number of different schemes, the two main ones
being the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) and the Existing Liabilities
Scheme (ELS). The former is a voluntary scheme to which all NHS hospital Trusts and
primary care trusts (PCTs) currently belong (although membership is not compulsory),
and covers clinical incidents occurring on or after the date when the Trust joined the
scheme. Until April 2002, Trusts were able to select a deductible, and were responsible
for handling and funding claims below that level. In April 2002 however, these lower
value claims were “called-in”, and all CNST claims are now handled centrally by the
NHSLA, although the Trust remains the legal defendant. The scheme is funded by ‘pay-
as-you-go’ contributions from hospitals which are determined primarily on the basis of
the risk classification of each hospital, which in turn is determined by the NHSLA using
a formula based on numbers of clinical staff in different specialties to estimate expected
NHS CNST claim costs.
The “call-in” of all claims in 2002 and the ending of risk sharing via excesses has
potentially diluted hospital incentives to invest in patient safety (see Fenn et al, 2004).
However, the NHSLA has also developed the use of experience- and merit-rating. The
former has played a relatively small role in the assessment of contributions to date, in
part because the scheme has not reached maturity and full claims history is still being
acquired. In the case of merit-rating, each hospital is assessed against three levels of risk
management standards every two years. Trusts which are assessed as complying with the
standards are then given a discount on their scheme contribution for the following two
financial years. The discounts on CNST contributions are 10% (level 1 compliance), 20%
(level 2 compliance) and 30% (level 3 compliance). The average CNST contribution paid
by NHS hospital Trusts in 2005/6 was approximately £1.7m, with many larger Trusts
contributing significantly more than this. Achieving higher level risk management
standards can therefore produce significant financial savings, potentially creating
incentives for Trusts to invest in patient safety. The process by which risk management
standards are assessed involves the review of a large number of processes across a wide
spectrum of activities which might directly or indirectly influence diagnostic care. For
example, current (2009-10) risk management standards for hospitals specify that
organizations can demonstrate processes to ensure staff are adequately trained to use
diagnostic equipment safely. Although they impose no requirements concerning the
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actual use of clinical diagnostic tests, this has been identified a risk area for potential
inclusion in future standards.
3. Estimation 
As noted above, our intention is to explore the extent to which liability risk-sharing
measures across NHS hospitals are associated with activities relevant to patient safety in
these hospitals, such as the use of diagnostic measures. In particular, we intend to test
whether hospitals choosing larger deductibles or higher risk management standards will
choose higher diagnostic care levels, ceteris paribus, as these incentive mechanisms intend.
The data acquired for this project – described in the following section – constitute a
panel of cross-sections (hospitals) over time (annual observations), and are in the form of
counts of the numbers of diagnostic tests observed in each hospital in a given year. For
each such measure, we therefore seek to estimate the relationship between these counts
and the hospital’s CNST excess level and/or risk management standard, controlling for
throughput, casemix and caselength variations across hospitals. Moreover, because the
hospital’s choice of excess (prior to 2002), and its decisions with respect to risk
management expenditure, are potentially choice variables, we also allow for regressor
endogeneity using a dynamic GMM system estimator. We now outline this estimation
strategyin more detail.
 
For a given hospital i, the process by which observed data are generated on the numbers
of diagnostic tests in year t could be characterised as a Poisson process with a rate of
occurrence, πit. The observed total number of tests would clearlydepend on a measure of
patients’ diagnostic requirements – that is, the number of treatment episodes for the
hospital in a given year (Tit). Consequently, the expected number of tests in a given year
at a given hospital would be Titπit where πit represents the mean probability of a test
during a given treatment episode. Given an assumed Poisson process, this would imply
that the observed number of tests (xit) in hospital i in year t is distributed with density
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The parameter πit can be modelled as a function of observed covariates and unobserved
random variables. With a conventional loglinear specification of this function, we have
π β β ε= + + +2 3exp( )it it it it itd e1β ρ (2)
Where ρit is a vector of measures capturing the hospital’s location, casemix and activity
rates (length of stay, bed utilisation rate). The variable dit measures the risk management
standard achieved by the hospital and variable eit measures the deductible; β1, 2 and3
are the associated coefficients. The error term εit measures the impact of unobserved
heterogeneity in the underlying risk across hospitals: given the difficulty in capturing
through observables all variations in case complexity, management efficiency, and other
local factors, this is likely to be a significant determinant of inter-hospital variation in
infection rates.
The availability of a panel of data on hospitals over a period of six years allows us to
obtain valuable additional observations on diagnostic tests, increasing the power of the
cross-sectional analysis as well as exploring changes in diagnostic care over time. In
addition, however, the extra data also raises the possibility of addressing the unobserved
heterogeneity across hospitals through specifying εit. = ui + vit and then taking into
account these hospital-level effects in the estimation process 
If we maintain the loglinear assumption for the relationship between the incidence of
tests and observed covariates (equation (2)), a more general specification of the data
generation process would be
β β= + + + +2 3exp( )it it it it i it
it
x
d e u v
T 1
β ρ (3)
Furthermore, if xit is strictlypositive, equation (3) can be transformed for estimation as
β β= + + + +2 3ln( )it it it it i it
it
x
d e u v
T 1
β ρ (4)
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Assuming exogeneity of both ρit., dit and eit this log-linear model (with dependent variable
the log of the rate of testing11) could be consistently estimated using either a random-
effect GLS estimator or an OLS fixed-effect estimator.  
However, as pointed out earlier, we believe that d and e are potentially endogenous
regressors due to the discretion hospital management has when deciding what level of
deductible is appropriate, as well as what expenditure is required on risk management
activities. If we can further assume that E[ln(εit)|z] is a constant independent of an
instrumental variable vector z, then even where d and e are shown to be endogenous it is
possible to estimate consistently the parameters of the log-linear model at (4) using an
instrumental variable approach. Critically, there are relatively few clear external
possibilities available to us for instrumental variable purposes, and it is natural then to
look to lagged values for instruments. In addition, it is possible that there is a degree of
persistence in the reported rate of testing within a given hospital. If this is believed to be
a significant factor, then the appropriate estimating equation will have a lagged
dependent variable as one of the regressors. In the case of the loglinear version of the
data generating process, we would have:
α β β−
−
= + + + + +1 2 3
1
ln( ) ln( )it it it it it i it
it it
x x
d e u v
T T 1
β ρ (5)
where the parameter α measures the degree of persistence.
In estimating (5) we have an additional source of endogeneity bias through the presence
of the lagged dependent variable (“dynamic panel bias”). Moreover, in this case the
standard fixed-effect estimator is unable to solve this problem using higher lags of the
dependent variable as instruments. The usual solution to this problem is to resort to the
use of first differencing of the data, and then to estimate the resulting equation using
GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The (differenced) lagged dependent variable remains
endogenous, but now it is possible to use the lagged levels of the dependent variable as
instruments. However, in circumstances where there is stochastic variation in the
dependent variable around a relatively stable trend, it has been shown that difference
GMM lacks efficiency because in that case lagged levels convey little information about
11 Note that there may be more than one test per treatment episode, so the left-hand side of equation (3) is
in the form of a rate, not a probability (i.e. it could in practice exceed one for some hospitals and some
types of test). Hence a log-linear specification (rather than a logit) is appropriate.
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future changes (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Drawing on Arellano and Bover (1995),
Blundell and Bond show that an alternative is to estimate (5) as an untransformed
equation in levels, using the differences in the lagged dependent variable as instruments.
These differenced instruments are exogenous providing that they are uncorrelated with
the fixed effects ui.12 They can be added to the instruments in levels from the difference
GMM estimator to form a potentially more efficient system GMM estimator (Blundell
and Bond, 1998). We have used this system GMM estimator below for each of the
diagnostic tests for which we have data, and in each case we have assumed endogeneity
in respect of the hospital’s deductible and risk management standards. External
instruments used are the hospital’s total number of new claims for clinical negligence,
and a measure of its financial strength (operating surplus as a percentage of overall
expenditure). These instruments are entered contemporaneously, and are chosen on the
intuitive basis that the claims experience and financial performance of hospitals may well
affect their choice of deductible and risk management standard respectively, but should
not directly influence the number of diagnostic tests felt to be clinically desirable.
Additional internal instruments used are the contemporaneous and lagged values of the
exogenous regressors, as well as the second and higher lagged values of the endogenous
variables (i.e. the lagged dependent variable, the deductible and risk management
standards). We are aware that this approach to identification potentially leads to a
number of superfluous instruments. In particular, the deductibles for the years after 2002
are all set to zero, and are therefore exogenous, so the use of lagged values as instruments
is unnecessary for these observations.13 A similar issue arises with respect to the risk
management standards, as some hospitals are not re-inspected every year. However,
while our approach therefore has some cost in terms of efficiency, the estimates should
remain consistent, providing that tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject
instrument exogeneity. For robustness we also estimated alternative models in which the
deductibles and risk management standards were treated as exogenous (these are
available from the authors on request, but they did not substantively affect our findings
as set out in Section 5 below).  
 
12 It can be shown that, under certain assumptions, this requirement is equivalent to one about the initial
conditions of the data generating process (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
13 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
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4. Data 
Information on the deductibles chosen by each Trust in each year between 1995 and
2001 was provided by the NHSLA, and Table 1 shows the number of Trusts selecting
particular deductibles in each year.
Table 1 near here
Prior to 1997, a deductible level of £100,000 was compulsory. Most Trusts opted for
lower levels after choice was introduced in subsequent years, and from 2002 all Trusts
had a £0 deductible as a consequence of the policy shift described above. Consequently
during our period of analysis (2000 to 2004) there were two years during which hospitals
experienced various different deductible levels, and three subsequent years when the
deductibles were effectivelyzero.
The NHSLA also provided us with information on risk management scores for each
hospital, consisting of the 2-yearly or yearly assessments which provide the basis on
which discounts for risk management performance are assessed, and Table 2 shows the
overall risk management levels attained byyear from 2000 to 2005.
Table 2 near here
It is evident that as the assessment of risk management standards has developed, the
number of Trusts on the lowest risk management scores of 0 or 1 has declined
significantly, while the number attaining higher standard levels has increased.14
In order to capture variations in care levels across hospitals, we focused on indicators of
diagnostic activity, specifically in relation to the use of imaging tests; these can be viewed
as proxies for the degree of diagnostic care exercised by clinical decision-takers in each
hospital, as well as the diagnostic resources made available to clinicians by hospital
management.
14 The reductions in the total number of hospitals between 2000 and 2002 are largely accounted for by
hospital mergers and consolidation
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Table 3 shows data on the mean number of different types of diagnostic imaging
activities undertaken by Trusts over the period 2000-2004. Figure 1 shows how the
numbers of keyimaging tests have been distributed across hospitals during this period.
 
Figure 1 and Table 3 near here
 
The variability in the number of events shown in the Figure is striking, but of course is
driven in part byvariations in activity levels in the respective hospitals (i.e. the number of
treatment episodes), as well as different casemix and other factors.
In attempting to discover the additional role played by liability risk-sharing arrangements,
we clearly need to take into account and control for these other factors, and we have
done so by using indicators of throughput, case-mix and caselength, derived from
Hospital Episodes Statistics (Department of Health, 2006). Table 4 shows the mean
values of these control variables for the years 2003 and 2004.
Table 4 near here
 
5. Results and discussion 
Our analysis explores the relationship between hospital CNST excess levels, risk
management standards and the utilization of diagnostic imaging tests over the five year
period from 2000 to 2004, with diagnostic tests viewed as one proxy for level of care. In
the middle of this period (in 2002), as described above, the NHSLA implemented a
policy shift which removed the ability of hospitals to choose an excess level, in effect
reducing the deductible to zero for all hospitals. The results of our dynamic system
GMM regressions are presented in Table 5. In all cases the first order autocorrelation is
significant, as to be expected. The second order autocorrelation is insignificant in all
cases but one (X-rays) where it is marginally significant at the 5% level. In all cases the J-
test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null of instrument independence.
Table 5 near here
The table suggests that by far the most significant determinant of all the diagnostic tests
we study is previous use (i.e. the one-period lagged dependent variable). In all cases the
coefficient is strongly significant and below one, suggesting a significant degree of
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persistence in the use of these tests. In particular, the high volume tests such as X-rays,
CT scans and non-specific ultrasound scans have coefficients close to one, indicating a
very slow adjustment process; these tests are prescribed in a fairly routine manner, and
the hospital’s budgeted capacity is presumably determined in part by reference to the
previous year’s expenditure. The impact of the hospital’s mean length of stayalso has a
generally positive and significant effect on the rate of testing, particularly so for MRI
scans and obstetric ultrasound scans. Presumably the frequency of these tests is sensitive
to the duration of the patient’s period of observation and monitoring while in hospital.
As expected, hospitals with higher proportions of general surgery make more significant
use of CT scans, MRI scans and X-rays, while those specializing in gynaecology and
obstetrics make statistically more use of obstetric scans. Perhaps it is not surprising that,
having controlled for these hospital characteristics, others (such as specialtyand location)
do not on the whole seem to play a significant role in the use of diagnostic and imaging
tests.
Most important from our perspective are the coefficients on ‘Deductible and ‘CNST
levels 2/3’ – i.e. our measures of liability risk based on insurance deductibles and
attainment of high risk management standards (and associated lowinsurance premiums).
If either of these provides incentives to supply care, we might expect significant positive
coefficients here. In fact, all the coefficients here are insignificant, though manyhave the
‘correct’ sign. This suggests that our measures of the inceitves for care under risk sharing
arrangements are not major determinants of diagnostic and imaging activity. In particular,
it suggests that the policy shift in 2002 to transfer liability risk from hospitals to the
NHSLA, and the subsequent emphasis on risk management discounts, has not had any
discernible effect on diagnostic testing behaviour in NHS hospitals.
This result suggests a number of possible explanations. One possibility is that tort
liability can be a powerful incentive for care but that the incentives inherent in the
NHSLA’s arrangements with hospitals are suboptimal. Although hospitals chose their
own excesses prior to 2002, these were typically below £25,000 in most cases and this
may have provided weak incentives. Similarly the range of risk management standards
and discounts on offer may have been too limited. If this is true, our results have
implications for policy makers seeking to incentive care – and perhaps for the merits of
using a monopoly insurer when competitive pressures may have provided a wider menu
of risk sharing arrangements.
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Another possibility is that our proxies for care are not the best ones for identifying the
effects of enterprise liability risk. In particular, diagnostic tests are perhaps more
responsive to ‘clinician-targeted’ initiatives when, consistent with the NHS’s enterprise
liability system, the incentive mechanisms explored here may be more appropriately
thought of as ‘hospital-targeted’. If this is correct, we might expect to find stronger
effects when proxying care by hospital initiatives such as infection control. These are
legitimate points but it should also be noted that diagnostic care has been used elsewhere
in the literature as a measure of care and, in principle, is clearly an observable proxy for
the underlying latent variable which is a clinician's desired level of confidence in their
diagnosis. One possible response to this is that much of the literature using diagnostic
tests to proxy care hails from the US, where they have sometimes been interpreted as
good measures of excess or supplier-induced care. However, overall diagnostic rates are
very much lower in the UK,15 rendering that interpretation less likely. Other institutional
differences could alter the interpretation of diagnostic activity as a proxy for care levels
in the UK. For example, in the US, privately insured care decisions may be more a
matter of clinician choice than in a relatively ‘cash-constrained’ NHS. This may then be
an additional reason whywe find a weak link between these and mechanisms designed to
incentivise care. In fact, though such differences should be acknowledged, theyneed not
undermine our interpretation of diagnostic imaging. For instance, even cash-constrained
hospitals can decide to allocate extra resources to measures of ‘care’ that can reduce
liabilityrisk. In addition, there is evidence that NHS physicians can exercise discretion in
the application of such measures (for example, Gillan et al, 2001, discuss the
discretionaryuse of radiologyin treatment of lower back pain).16
Interestingly, mention of hospital decision making raises another issue: howdo hospitals
relay the incentives they face back to individual clinicians and, therefore, influence their
subsequent care decisions: i.e. the internal operation of enterprise liability in the NHS?
Legal proponents predict beneficial effects from adopting enterprise liability: for
example, cost savings from not having to cite multiple defendants in an action, and
‘accuracy’ gains from lifting the case awayfrom the clinician’s emotional and reputational
involvement. Economic theory has also been used to examine the effects of enterprise
15 In 2007 MRI rates were 91 per 1,000 population in the US compared with 29 in the UK, and CT scans
were 228 per 1,000 population in the US compared with 59 in the UK. (OECD 2009)
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liability on care. Kornhauser (1982) provides the initial analysis to this effect: in a
principal-agent setting with wealth constrained agents (clinicians), it may be optimal to
switch liability to the deep pockets of the hospital, who offers a contract trading risk for
care in return. Chu and Qian (1995) and Zeiler (2004) also consider the effects of
liability rules in a principal-agent setting while Arlen and MacLeod (2005) provide a
sophisticated model in which clinician expertise and MCO authority co-exist. (See also
Arlen and MacLeod, 2003). They show that the presence of expertise encourages the
MCO to reviewclinician activityand that the resulting distortions in care make it liable to
transfer liability to the MCO. The burden of these models is that hospitals can solve the
principal-agent problems they face and pass on to their clinicians the incentives to secure
patient care that arise from liabilityrules.
In fact, it may not be straightforward in practice to address the principal-agent issues at
the heart of the foregoing literature. As Williamson and others have pointed out,
complex organizations can suffer from considerable inefficiencies, not least in terms of
communications and internal incentives. Harris (1976) addresses such points explicitlyto
hospitals. He argues that the hospital is “two firms in one”: a medical staff and an
administration, each with “its own objectives, decision variables and constraints” and,
therefore, “locked in a noncooperative oligopoly-type game”. The resulting coordination
problem can lead to suboptimal decision making and weak communication lines. Harris
does not consider the implications of the analysis for the effects of enterprise liability on
care, but a reasonable inference may be that hospitals are not good at passing the tort
incentives to their employees and, as such, the variations in liability may have a weaker
effect on care than expected.17
Thus, another potential interpretation of our results is that enterprise liability (at least, as
operated in the NHS) may dilute the power of the incentives for care contained in
insurance deductibles and risk management standards with premium discounts: hospitals
may be too complex, or too resource constrained, to translate hospital-wide incentives
into clinician-level ones. If this is the case, it suggests that enterprise liability rules need
to be implemented in the context of careful organisational design.
17 Shortell et al (1976) provide some early empirical analysis on the role of organisational mechanisms in
hospital performance (though not in direct relation to malpractice). Their results suggest that better
specification of procedures and increased visibility within the hospital improves performance (costs and
quality– measured byvariables such as mortalityrates and probabilities of complications).
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6. Conclusions
The safety of patients is an important responsibility of health care providers, and
significant compensation costs mayarise if providers are negligent. An increasing trend is
for liability for such compensation to be placed with the hospital rather than the
individual clinician, a system known as ‘enterprise liability’. Hospitals in England and
Wales have been subject to this system since 1990, and risk pooling arrangements have
emerged subsequently allowing hospitals to transfer their liability risk to an agency - the
NHS Litigation Authority. In this paper we have explored for or the first time some of
the mechanisms used by this agency to provide hospital management with financial
incentives to take care. We have estimated the influence of these arrangements on the use
of diagnostic imaging tests within hospitals, using a panel data set covering the period
2000-2004, during which period a policy shift took place leading to a form of “natural
experiment”.18
As always in such analyses, much turns on the selection of suitable instruments and on
the interpretation of keyvariables. We have acknowledged these points, and commented
on our use of diagnostic imaging tests as a reasonable discretionary measure of care that
may affect liability risk. Bearing both points in mind, our results suggest that the use of
diagnostic tests did not respond to the incentives created during this period. We have
speculated that certain types of patient care activity, including the use of diagnostic tests,
may be less responsive to incentives placed at the level of the hospital by comparison
with incentives placed at the level of the clinician. Nevertheless, to the extent that
diagnostic care is constrained by management-provided resources, or ability to
design/implement internal incentive mechanisms, these results may cast some doubt on
the sensitivityof hospital management to financial incentives arising from their liabilityto
patients. Our findings have implications for jurisdictions contemplating a move to
enterprise liability, as well as wider implications for public sector organizations faced with
financial incentives to improve service quality. As well as the need for continued
research into the effects of incentive mechanisms to enhance care in health (and
elsewhere), we believe that our results also suggest a research agenda relating to
organisational design in health care. This would examine the role of such design in
18 In principle, the data allowan improvement on Fenn et al (2007) because the dynamic panel offers the
chance to explore the use of diagnostic care across hospitals and over time.
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communicating and implementing high-level incentives within the organization, as
required byeffective enterprise liabilityarrangements.
 
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
19
References 
Abraham, K. and Weiler, P. (1994) “Enterprise medical liabilityand the evolution of the
American health care system.” Harvard LawReview, 108(2), 381-436.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991) “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations.” Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2), 277-297.
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995) “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation
of error-components models.” Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
Arlen, J. and MacLeod, W. (2003) “Malpractice liability for physicians and managed Care
Organisations.” NewYork UniversityLawReview, 78(6), 1929-2006.
Arlen, J. and MacLeod, W. (2005) “Torts, expertise, and authority: Liabilityof physicians
and Managed Care Organizations.” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 494-519.
Baker, T. (2005) The medical malpractice myth. U of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Baldwin, L., Hart, G., Lloyd, M., Fordyce, M.and Rosenblatt, R. (1995) “Defensive
medicine and obstetrics.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 274(20), 1606-
1610.
Beider, P. and Hagen, S. (2004) “Limiting tort liability for medical malpractice.”
Congressional Budget Office, Washington DC.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998) “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models.” Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
Bovbjerg, R. and Berenson, R. (2006) “Enterprise liability in the Twenty-First Century.”
In: Sage, W. and Kersh, R. (Eds), Medical malpractice and the US health care system,
Cambridge UP, Cambridge UK.
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
20
Bovbjerg, R. and Sloan, F. (1998) “No fault for medical injury: Theory and evidence.”
Universityof Cincinnati LawReview, 67.
Chu, C. and Qian, Y. (1995) “Vicarious liability under a negligence rule.” International
Reviewof Lawand Economics, 15, 305-322.
Cummins, J., Weiss, M and Phillips, R. (2001) “The incentive effects of no-fault
automobile insurance.” Journal of Lawand Economics, 44(2), 427-464.
Danzon, P.M., 2000a. “Liability reform: Traditional and radical alternatives.” In:
Feldman, R.D. (Ed.), American Health Care: Government. Market Processes and the
Public Interest. The Independent Institute, California.
Danzon, P.M., 2000b. “Liability for medical malpractice.” In: Culyer, A.J., Newhouse,
J.P. (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, 1B. Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
Department of Health (2003): “Making Amends: A consultation paper setting out
proposals for reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS. A report by the
Chief Medical Officer”, Department of Health: London
Department of Health (2006 et seq): “Hospital Episode Statistics”, Department of
Health: London.
Devlin, R. (1992) “Liability versus no-fault automobile insurance regimes: An analysis of
the experience in Quebec.” In: Dionne, G. (Ed) Contributions to Insurance Economics,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell MA.
Dubay, L., Laestner, R., Waidmann, T. (1999) “The impact of malpractice fears on
cesarian section rates.” Journal of Health Economics 18 (4), 491-522.
Dubay, L., Laestner, R., Waidmann, T. (2001) “Medical malpractice liability and its
effects on prenatal care utilization and infant health.” Journal of Health Economics 20
(4), 591-611.
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
21
Fenn, P.; Rickman, N.; Gray, A. (2004), “The economics of clinical negligence reform in
England.” Economic Journal, Vol.114 (496), pp. F272-292
Fenn, P.; Rickman, N.; Gray, A. (2007) “Liability, insurance and medical practice.”
Journal of Health Economics 26(5), 1057-1070.
Gillan, M. G. C.; Gilbert, F. J.; Andrew, J. E.; Grant, A. M.; Wardlaw, D.; Valentine, N.
W.; Gregori, A. C. (2001) “Influence of imaging on clinical decision making in the
treatment of lower back pain.” Radiology220, 393-399
Harris, J. (1976) “The internal organization of hospitals: Some economic implications.”
Bell Journal of Economics, 8(2), 467-482.
Kessler, D. and McClellan, M., (1996) “Do doctors practice defensive medicine?”
QuarterlyJournal of Economics 111 (2), 353-390.
Kolstad, C. Ulen, T. & Johnson, G. (1990): “Ex post liability for harm vs ex ante safety
regulation: Substitutes or complements?” American Economic Review, 80(4), 888-901.
Kornhauser, L. (1982) “An economic analysis of the choice between enterprise and
personal liabilityfor accidents.” California LawReview, 70(6), 1345-1392.
Leone Jr, A. (2006) “The virtual reality of enterprise liability.” Britcher, Leone & Roth,
LLC.
Localio, A., Lawthers, A., Bengston, J., Hebert, L., Weaver, S., Brennan, T and Landis, J.
(1993) “Relationship between malpractice claims and Cesarian delivery.” Journal of the
American Medical Association, 269(3): 366-373.
McEwin, I. (1989) “No-fault and road accidents: Some Australasian evidence.”
International Reviewof Lawand Economics, 9: 13-24.
Mello, M. and Brennan, T. (2002) “Deterrence of medical errors: Theory and evidence
for malpractice reform.” Texas LawReview, 80.
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
22
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009). “OECD Health Data
2009. OECD, Paris.
Peters Jr, P. (2008) “Resuscitating hospital enterprise liability.” Missouri LawReview, 73,
369-397.
Shavell, S. (1984) “A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation.” RAND
Journal of Economics, 15(2), 271-280.
Shavell, S. (1987) Economic analysis of accident law. Harvard UP, Cambridge MA.
Shortell, S., Becker, S. and Neuhauser, D. (1976) “The effects of management practices
on hospital efficiency and quality of care.” In: Shortell, S. and Brown, M. (Eds.)
Organizational research in hospitals, Inquiry monograph, Blue Cross Association,
September, 90-107.
Sloan, F. and Chepke, L. (2008) Medical malpractice. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Sloan, F., Entman, S., Reilly, B., Glass, C., Hickson, G. and Zhang, H. (1997) “Tort
liability and obstetricians’ care levels.” International Review of Law and Economics, 17,
245-260.
Steves, M. (1975) “A proposal to improve the cost to benefit relationships in the medical
professional liability insurance system.” Duke LawJournal.
Wallis, H., and Mulcahy, L. (2001) “Cause for Complaint: An evaluation of the
effectiveness of the NHS complaints procedure.” London, Public LawProject.
Weiler, P. (1991) “Medical Malpractice on Trial.” Harvard UP, Cambridge MA.
Zeiler, K. (2004) “Medical malpractice and contract disclosure: An equilibrium model of
the effects of legal rules on behaviour in health care markets.” Georgetown Law and
Economics Research Paper no. 539224, Georgetown University.
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
23
Tables and figures 
Table 1: Number of Trusts by deductible level and year, 1995-2005 
Year Deductible Levels
£0 £10k £25k £50k £100k £250k £500k Total
1995 0 0 0 0 366 0 0 366
1996 0 0 0 0 383 0 0 383
1997 0 58 218 82 35 2 0 395
1998 0 123 179 67 27 1 0 397
1999 0 139 159 59 31 0 2 390
2000 0 133 131 47 26 0 1 338 
2001 0 130 102 38 25 0 1 296 
2002 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 245 
2003 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 239 
2004 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 239 
2005 173 0 0 0 0 0 0 173
Note: figures in bold relate to the period analysed in this paper
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Table 2: Frequency distribution of overall risk management levels, 2000-2005 
 
Year Risk management scores: Total
0 1 2 3  
2000 81 207 33 1 322 
2001 44 208 38 1 291 
2002 47 159 36 3 245 
2003 12 176 46 5 239 
2004 0 176 53 10 239 
2005 0 90 73 10 173
Note: figures in bold relate to the period analysed in this paper
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Table 3: Imaging activity by year: (Average number per Trust) 
 
Year CT
scans
MRI
scans
Obstetric
scans
Non-obstetric
scans
X-rays Radio-isotope
scans
Fluoro-
scopies
2000 7,754 3,636 10,438 15,594 87,723 3,434 6,057
2001 8,881 4,127 11,376 17,745 95,218 3,467 6,330
2002 10,488 4,761 13,150 20,783 111,803 3,676 7,647
2003 11,228 4,834 11,559 21,601 111,454 3,232 6,879
2004 12,207 5,389 11,833 22,212 111,270 3,151 6,780
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Table 4: Activity levels and casemix indicators, NHS Trusts 2003-2004
2003 2004
Mean no. of finished consultant episodes 56,279 57,760
Mean length of stay(days) 12.3 12.6
Proportion of bed-days in:
General medicine 0.169 0.172
General surgery 0.072 0.072
Gynaecology 0.024 0.023
Obstetrics 0.026 0.026
Paediatrics 0.049 0.048
Orthopaedics 0.079 0.079
Urology 0.015 0.015
Other surgery 0.044 0.046
Other medicine 0.222 0.233
Mental illness 0.237 0.242
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Table 5: Diagnostic imaging tests in relation to CNST deductibles and risk 
management standards; System GMM regression results 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CT
scans
MRI
scans
Obst
scans
Other
scans
X-rays Radio-
iso
Fluoros
copies
Ln(test rate)[t-1] 0.872*** 0.634*** 0.468** 0.970*** 0.953*** 0.910*** 0.761***
(15.42) (4.55) (2.87) (28.78) (47.24) (13.01) (5.50)
Ln(length of stay) 0.358* 0.992** 1.248** 0.0661 0.140* 0.250 0.465
(2.36) (3.06) (3.26) (0.99) (2.04) (1.42) (1.61)
Ln(bed utilization rate) -0.0497 0.242 -0.346 -0.739 0.0481 -0.133 -0.171
(-0.32) (0.61) (-1.27) (-0.01) (0.46) (-0.49) (-0.75)
Deductible 0.080 0.452 0.402 0.099 0.176 0.148 0.712
(0.27) (0.66) (0.42) (0.41) (0.74) (0.52) (1.81)
CNST level2/3 -0.0063 0.0199 -0.0807 0.00261 0.00679 -0.0071 -0.0139
(-0.28) (0.27) (-1.39) (0.12) (0.32) (-0.19) (-0.41)
Proportion general surgery 2.748* 4.179*** 6.586*** 0.938 1.442** 1.321 3.074
(2.52) (3.31) (3.35) (1.61) (2.96) (1.26) (1.57)
Proportion gynaecology 0.566 0.381 5.871** -0.0230 -0.277 -0.0204 0.450
(1.08) (0.28) (2.60) (-0.07) (-1.24) (-0.04) (1.07)
Proportion obstetrics 0.208 0.949 6.586** 0.0248 -0.0496 0.194 0.0872
(0.35) (0.57) (3.14) (0.09) (-0.24) (0.34) (0.30)
Proportion paediatrics 0.336 1.562 1.144 0.0965 0.256 0.179 1.099
(1.27) (1.85) (1.08) (0.43) (1.27) (0.86) (1.60)
Proportion trauma & orthopaedics -0.0815 1.354 5.066** 0.296 0.272* -0.0810 0.636
(-0.44) (1.65) (2.84) (1.94) (2.04) (-0.48) (0.95)
Proportion urology 0.215 4.265 1.678 -0.108 -0.0918 0.457 3.036
(0.20) (1.82) (0.60) (-0.15) (-0.13) (0.42) (1.33)
Proportion other surgery 0.262 1.041 1.963* 0.164 0.197 0.375 1.524
(1.37) (1.51) (2.39) (0.96) (1.58) (1.29) (1.42)
Proportion other medicine 0.176 0.254 0.515* -0.0267 0.0372 0.129 0.141
(1.82) (1.27) (2.27) (-0.33) (0.60) (0.94) (1.04)
Proportion psychiatry -0.622** -0.637 0.600 -0.0350 -0.234 -0.156 0.0337
(-2.60) (-1.52) (1.21) (-0.13) (-1.06) (-0.59) (0.07)
Year=2002 0.0218 0.0607 0.103* -0.0128 -0.0002 0.0414 0.0395
(0.89) (1.38) (2.25) (-0.50) (-0.01) (1.23) (1.24)
Year=2003 0.0258 0.0912 0.140** -0.0219 -0.0170 -0.0319 0.0626*
(0.99) (1.13) (2.83) (-0.81) (-1.01) (-1.04) (1.97)
Year=2004 0.0340 0.175 0.243** -0.0337 -0.0197 -0.0289 0.0965*
(0.89) (1.88) (2.80) (-1.12) (-0.64) (-1.01) (2.41)
Single specialtyhospital 0.233 0.598* -0.909 0.0562 0.0778 0.133 0.0205
(1.65) (2.47) (-1.47) (1.09) (1.40) (0.89) (0.16)
Teaching hospital 0.0365 0.100 0.0151 0.0142 0.0110 0.0122 0.0345
(1.30) (1.39) (0.21) (0.68) (0.67) (0.35) (0.80)
East of England 0.0879 0.130 0.196 0.00154 0.0555 -0.0560 0.253
(1.12) (0.67) (0.75) (0.02) (1.29) (-0.85) (1.51)
London 0.0544 0.0619 0.143 0.0354 0.0304 -0.0590 0.129
(0.71) (0.31) (0.57) (0.46) (0.69) (-0.76) (0.82)
North East 0.0898 0.135 0.114 0.0484 0.0586 -0.0525 0.254
(1.24) (0.78) (0.46) (0.67) (1.39) (-0.75) (1.40)
North West 0.0816 0.0763 0.143 0.0545 0.0517 -0.0285 0.212
(1.12) (0.46) (0.60) (0.92) (1.35) (-0.40) (1.29)
South Central 0.102 0.239 0.145 0.0517 0.0507 -0.0767 0.337
DRAFT– DO NOT QUOTE
28
(1.20) (0.91) (0.51) (0.68) (1.06) (-0.80) (1.69)
South East 0.0927 0.0326 0.0244 0.0364 0.0533 -0.0170 0.190
(1.19) (0.20) (0.10) (0.54) (1.08) (-0.21) (1.26)
South West 0.142 0.245 0.184 0.0221 0.0561 -0.0457 0.307
(1.82) (1.15) (0.80) (0.32) (1.29) (-0.72) (1.70)
West Midlands 0.126 0.0313 0.277 0.0382 0.0440 -0.0431 0.277
(1.64) (0.19) (1.19) (0.61) (1.05) (-0.61) (1.70)
N 592 577 531 613 616 508 599
N of hospitals 166 165 150 169 172 140 168
2 1320996 242931 202160 2593996 5979696 975181 775491
AR(1) test statistic -3.576 -2.811 -1.245 -3.328 -3.053 -3.178 -1.467
p>AR(1) 0.00034 0.00494 0.213 0.00087 0.00226 0.00148 0.142
AR(2) test statistic 1.535 -1.549 1.422 0.926 1.998 -0.0074 1.124
p>AR(2) 0.125 0.121 0.155 0.355 0.0457 0.994 0.261
No. of instruments 68 67 67 67 67 67 68
Hansen J statistic 50.95 48.77 45.56 38.61 37.46 41.34 45.56
p>J 0.137 0.161 0.252 0.533 0.585 0.412 0.288
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Selected diagnostic imaging rates as distributed across NHS hospital 
Trusts, 2000-2004
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